--- title: 5 Times That The Nukes Were Nearly Launched description: "Truly, there are few prospects more terrifying than that of a nuclear war, something that, in its worst and most deadly iteration, could well have the potential to not just end advanced human civilisation as we know it, but potentially, all human life, period.\n\nBut at least it's never happened, right? As, after all, nuclear weapons were used in WWII, and after seeing just how truly devastating they were, the button was never pushed ever again – or so the story goes.\n\nAnd while, yes, that is indeed true, thank God, that doesn't mean that we haven't come really, **really** close to crossing the nuclear Rubicon; usually by accident, but also, and perhaps more shockingly still, intentionally, with the occasional General seemingly not having gotten the memo after WWII.\n\nIt's a prospect that is every bit as fascinating as it is terrifying, and so, today, we are going to be satisfying that curiosity by having a look at five times that the nukes were nearly launched.\n\n## 1. The Stanislav Petrov Incident\n\nEven by Cold War standards, the US and the USSR weren't exactly getting along come the 1980s. In 1979 alone, for example, the former had deployed RSD-10 Pioneer Medium Range Nuclear Missiles—capable of striking targets in West Germany, France, and the UK in less than 10 minutes—to its Western border in response to a NATO condemnation of its Invasion of Afghanistan the same year, and in turn, the US had adopted its so called 'Double-Track Decision' in December, which called for the deployment of Pershing II Medium Range Nuclear Missiles—themselves capable of hitting targets in Ukraine, Belarus, or Lithuania in sub-10 minutes—should talks to see the aforementioned RSDs removed from Europe fail.\n\nThis, naturally, was a bit of a tense situation, and what was needed in response was for calm heads to prevail on both sides of the Iron Curtain, so that the super powers could sit down at the same table, talk it out like adults, and find a way to step back from the nuclear brink with both their dignities, and indeed the world, still intact.\n\nThis being the Cold War however, that is not what happened, and instead, what happened was chest beating and windmilling a plenty on both sides; with the US going out of its way to 'probe' Soviet radar systems by flying bombers right towards Moscow, and other important targets, only to pull them away just before they entered Soviet Airspace. The Soviets, for their part, did **exactly the same** to NATO countries in return.\n\nWhat the world **really** didn't need amidst all of that was for an early-warning satellite to take a peculiar turn, and start falsely reporting that the other team had lit the match on some of its missiles, as, with things the way they were, the powers that be were far more likely to take leave of their senses, and order an immediate and full retaliation in response.\n\nAlas, on the 26th of September 1983, that is exactly what happened, as one of the Soviet Oko early-warning satellites, being monitored from an apocalypse proof bunker near Moscow, suddenly started saying that it had identified a single missile launch from the Continental United States, and then four more mere moments later.\n\nSat at the console was one Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov. According to the regulations, he should have phoned it into his superiors immediately, to give them all the time needed to get every possible missile out of its silo, and every possible bomber into the air, so that they could make damned sure that if they were going down, America was going down with them.\n\nLuckily, however, Petrov was one of God's thinkers, and so, as he sat there with the phone in his hand, being well aware of **exactly** what was at stake, he took a brief moment to consider the situation logically, and quickly happened upon the realisation that a launch of merely five missiles just didn't make sense; the Americans knew that if they launched even one missile, that they'd be getting the Soviet's entire arsenal in return, so surely they'd go all out?\n\nSensing that something was amiss, Petrov then went to compare the data his Oko satellite was feeding him with data from over-the-horizon radar installations, which showed… nothing.\n\nWith that, his phone was placed back in its receiver, and the world was saved, with it later being found out that the false alarm was triggered by an unusual alignment of sunlight reflecting off of high-altitude clouds.\n\nIt's a good thing he was so level-headed too, because at that time the Soviet Leader was one Yuri Andropov, a former KGB man who harboured a **deep** mistrust of his American equivalent, and if the incorrect data had been relayed to him, well, let's just say a reasoned and well considered response would have been unlikely.\n\n## 2. The Korean War\n\nNuclear weapons **may** have also been dangerously close to being deployed in the Korean War too; and we can't stress the word 'may' enough – as it's quite the unclear and contentious matter all in all.\n\nCertainly, there is no doubt that the US was willing to use them, as, on the 1st of August 1950, the 9th Bomb Wing of the US Airforce, which was equipped with 10 B-29 Bombers, each carrying a single Mark 4 Atomic Bomb apiece, was dispatched to Guam, where they were to stay on standby as a so called \"Atomic Task Force,\" one that was primed and ready to go, should the call come down.\n\nKnowing that, the question is less 'would they have done it,' and more 'under what conditions would they have done it.' It is also a question that revolves around one man, and that would be Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea, as many argue that he was **rather** enthusiastic to smash the big red button.\n\nWhat **is** known for certain is that on the 9th of December 1950, he requested authority as a Field Commander to deploy atomic bombs as he saw fit; albeit stressing that he only wished to use them if the United Nations Forces were pushed back to the point of being routed from the Peninsula.\n\nAnd he didn't want to just use them on North Korean and Chinese troops on the Peninsula either, as 15 days later, on Christmas Eve in fact, he submitted a list of prospective targets to the Pentagon. We won't worry about what he called these, as he used a word that has aged **very** badly, but we will worry about what his aim was: to decimate both North Korea and China so extensively, that continued military resistance became impossible, and for this, he had chalked up 34 targets.\n\nWith time, some of the Joint Chiefs became so concerned over the prospect of MacArthur getting a bit trigger happy with the nukes, that in 1951 they completely pulled the 9th Bomb Wing from his roster, and instead handed it to Strategic Air Command; an organisation that had absolutely nothing to do with MacArthur. As a result, there were no blurry grey lines, no middlemen of unclear authority; just the President that would give the order, the B-29s that would execute it, and a single direct line of command and communication between the two.\n\nEventually, MacArthur was stripped of his command all together on the 11th of April, and so the matter became moot… but would he have **actually done** it? That's the question we need to get to the bottom of, and unfortunately, it's a question to which there is no clear answer even 70+ years after the fact.\n\nFor example, MacArthur himself swore under oath before a Senate Enquiry after the war that he had **never** explicitly recommended their use, and had also publicly admonished Truman in 1960 when the Former President had suggested that he had.\n\nBut then, on the flipside, he said this in a 1954 interview, quote:\n\n> \"I could have won the war in Korea in a maximum of 10 days.... I would have dropped between 30 and 50 atomic bombs on his air bases and other depots strung across the neck of Manchuria.... It was my plan as our amphibious forces moved south to spread behind us—from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea—a belt of radioactive cobalt. It could have been spread from wagons, carts, trucks and planes.... For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the north. The enemy could not have marched across that radiated belt.\"\n\nBut wait, it gets more complicated still, because while at this point, we might be tempted to write MacArthur off as a Doctor Strangelove character made real, both Presidents Nixon and Kennedy later claimed that he had urged **extreme** caution and hesitancy in deploying nuclear weapons when offering them personal counsel.\n\nUltimately, we simply don't know for certain. Someone was lying, that much is clear, but as to whom it was, it's likely we will never know at this point when the primary sources are full of such contradictory claims.\n\n## 3. The Norwegian Rocket Incident\n\nOur next nuclear near miss **actually occurred** after the Cold War, specifically on the 25th of January 1995. It was caused by the launch of a Black Brant XII rocket from the Andøya Rocket Range in Norway.\n\nIt wasn't even a military mission, with the rocket in question being a simple research rocket whose only payload was a load of measuring equipment, and the people who launched it, they were but humble American and Norwegian scientists, who were eagerly anticipating learning all manner of interesting things about the aurora borealis over Svalbard.\n\nUnbeknown to them, however, their rocket, launched from where it was, with the trajectory that it was, just so happened to coincide with a corridor that the Russians predicted the Americans would use, if they were to launch the Minuteman III ICBMs that they had in their North Dakota silos, and aim them at Moscow.\n\nIt got worse still however, because when the Olenegorsk early-warning radar station in Murmansk Oblast detected the Black Brant, to them, the speed and flight pattern resembled that of a US Navy submarine launched Trident ICBM; particularly if the US was trying to get the drop on Russia with an atmospheric detonation – the kind that would create an EMP effect that would devastate their electrical infrastructure, and leave the whole country's defence grid blind.\n\nNeither interpretation left a clean pair of underpants, and so the alert was raised, escalated through the military's hierarchy, and eventually found its way to then President Boris Yeltsin.\n\nFearing the worst, he immediately had Cheget, the 'nuclear briefcase' that allowed him to communicate instantaneously with all of Russia's nuclear forces from anywhere in the world primed, and with it, he ordered all of his submarine commanders to ready their missiles, and all of his bombers to get fuelled up and into the air, before then sitting down to watch the situation develop with his top military advisors. For eight minutes they sat there, Yeltsin ready and willing to give the greenlight if he deemed it necessary.\n\nFortunately, the Black Brant then began to veer away from Russian Airspace, and thus it was deemed that whatever it was, it posed no threat, and so the country's nuclear forces were stood down.\n\nNow, I know what you are all thinking, why didn't the scientists just inform Russia of what they were doing to prevent exactly this situation from happening?\n\nWell, funny story, they did, as well as 29 other countries in fact. But unfortunately, 90's Russia was… how to put it eloquently… 'a bit of a mess,' we'll say, and as a result, the scientists' heads up never reached where it needed to go; having gotten lost in a sea of incompetent bureaucracy, with some sources even saying that the report was passed solely to the Russian Coast Guard and Civilian Shipping Authority, after it had been interpreted as a warning to shipping as to where the rocket might end up landing.\n\nIf that sounds unbelievable, find your nearest Russian and ask them for their memories of the 90s; it was a **wild** time – and that's putting it mildly.\n\n## 4. The NORAD Computer Glitch\n\n1979, as we have already discussed, was a year when tensions started to **really** build up between the US and the USSR, after a series of unfortunate events that began with the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.\n\nWhat we haven't already discussed, however, was that 1979 also had its own nuclear near miss separate to all of that, and it all happened at the North American Air Defense Command, or NORAD, a Binational Military Command between the US and Canada that monitors and defends the two nations' airspace and provides early warnings of potential threats from the air, space, or sea.\n\nAs for what caused the near miss, that'd just be a simple computer glitch.\n\nIt was 3am when the display screens at NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado decided to go haywire. One moment, everything was quiet. The next, the screens lit up with the chilling message that 250 Soviet ICBMs were en-route to turn the US: enough to reduce the country to little but an atomic wasteland.\n\nNaturally, this little late-night surprise immediately put the US on full alert. The data got forwarded to every big-name command centre you can think of; the Pentagon's National Military Command Center, Strategic Air Command Headquarters, the Alternate National Military Command Center – the whole lot were immediately informed and put on high alert, with bombers being put into the air and missiles being primed ready to launch. Even the National Emergency Airborne Command Post—the plane that serves as the President's flying apocalypse proof war room—was prepped for take off.\n\nLuckily, in what is a recurring theme in nuclear near misses, a logical approach was chosen, with the powers that be wanting to make **absolutely sure** these missiles were both real, and coming their way, before they ordered a full retaliation.\n\nAnd much like had happened to Stanislav Petrov, supplementary ground-based radar systems and satellite data was checked, which showed… nothing. Not a single missile, just empty sky. They sat it out a few minutes just to be sure, and when sufficient time had passed to make it clear that no missiles were inbound—about seven minutes—a big breath was taken by all, and America's nuclear arsenal was stood down.\n\nSo, what happened then?\n\nThe answer to that, could just be the worst one we have seen yet, as this one wasn't even caused by a civilian rocket that they were ignorant of, or an early-warning satellite getting a duff reading off of some unforeseen weather condition, no. Instead, it was caused by human error, as some bright spark had loaded the wrong tape into the NORAD computer; specifically, one that was meant to be used for training exercises, and made the computer simulate the Russians launching a full surprise attack.\n\nKnowing that, we suspect that said training tape went missing shortly afterwards, the only hint as to where it ended up being a single poor recruit who was walking like John Wayne for weeks afterwards.\n\n## 5. The B-59 Incident\n\nAs far as nuclear flashpoints go, there was probably none greater than the Cuban Missile Crisis, when, for 13 terrifying days in October 1962, the US and the USSR locked horns over a load of R-12 Medium Range, and R-14 Intermediate Range, Nuclear Missiles that the Soviets had plonked in the crisis' titular country.\n\nThe story is a well told one: lots of fear, lots of chest beating, and the USSR eventually pledging to remove its missiles from Cuba openly in exchange for the US removing some missiles from Turkey secretly – all the while their nuclear arsenals were primed and pointed at one another, ready to go at a moment's notice.\n\nBut that synopsis, while terrifying enough in its own right, is only actually part of the story, because in the shadows, or more specifically under the waves, as the broader crisis played out, there was a far, **far** closer shave with nuclear Armageddon.\n\nIt happened on the 27th of October, aboard B-59, a Soviet Project 641 Class submarine that was packing a little something extra: a T-5 nuclear tipped torpedo… and it **very** nearly launched it.\n\nNuclear torpedoes, in case you don't know, are a uniquely terrifying sort of weapon. Quite literally just being 'normal' torpedoes, but with a nuclear payload, they can be deployed to outright destroy multiple ships that they catch in their blast, both surface and submerged, as well as destroy countless more as they create waves of such intense force and pressure that ships caught in it, simply crack and fall apart.\n\nAs for how B-59 came to nearly launch its T-5, that would be because the US Navy was blockading Cuba during the crisis, and to prevent said blockade from being circumvented, **all** submarines that were detected were ordered to surface and identify themselves; and this was communicated by the dropping of reduced yield training depth charges in their vicinity.\n\nDoing so was a well understood practise, but unfortunately, conditions aboard B-59 weren't exactly conducive to keeping a clear head. In fact, they were basically akin to a living nightmare, having been submerged for days, and thus being unable to recharge batteries, take on fresh air, or vent heat. As a result, oxygen was running low, carbon dioxide was building up, and the crew was sweaty, exhausted.\n\nAnd none were affected by those terrible conditions more than B-59's Captain, Valentin Savitsky. In his stressed state, when depth charges started detonating around him, he was convinced that his submarine was under attack, and that it was go time as a result; a situation that wasn't helped by his being cut off from Moscow – and thus having no idea if a wider attack was under way.\n\nFinally snapping under the pressure, he declared, quote:\n\n> \"We're going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all — we will not disgrace our Navy!\"\n\nNow, while that might have been a jolly exciting declaration, in Soviet Doctrine, the call wasn't his to make, with the deployment of nuclear weapons being **such** a big deal, that it could only be done with unanimous agreement of all Senior Officers on board.\n\nAt that time, there were three such Officers, and while B-59's Political Commissar Ivan Maslennikov agreed, the 2IC, Vasili Arkhipov, did not.\n\nHe reasoned that such an extreme choice should only be made following **clear** orders, and after much screaming across the sub's bridge, Maslennikov and Savitsky came around to his way of thinking. Then, with nothing else to be done, B-59 surfaced, was told by the US Navy that no war had started, and that was that; potentially world ending escalation had been averted.\n\nThe Soviets, as you would well expect, were quite keen to keep what had (nearly) happened aboard B-59 under wraps, and so the story was hidden, and its protagonist gagged for 40 years, with Arkhipov's world saving heroics only coming to the surface, pun intended, during a conference that marked the 40th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 2002.\n\nSadly, Arkhipov had passed away only four years prior, and so he never got to know of the reverence with which he is now regarded. But, for what it's worth Arkhipov, if you happen to get YouTube up in heaven; on behalf of every human of your time, today, and from the future, all of whom live only because of your decision – thank you.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- The world has come close to nuclear war multiple times due to accidents and miscommunications.\n- Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov prevented a potential nuclear war in 1983 by correctly identifying a false alarm.\n- During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur's intentions regarding nuclear weapons remain unclear.\n- A Norwegian research rocket launch in 1995 nearly triggered a nuclear response from Russia due to misinterpretation.\n- Human error and technical glitches have played significant roles in near-miss nuclear incidents.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What was the Stanislav Petrov Incident?\n\nThe Stanislav Petrov Incident occurred on September 26, 1983, when a Soviet early-warning satellite falsely reported that the United States had launched missiles. Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, who was monitoring the satellite, logically deduced that the report was incorrect and did not relay the false alarm to his superiors, preventing a potential nuclear retaliation.\n\n### What was the Korean War's nuclear threat?\n\nDuring the Korean War, the U.S. had B-29 bombers equipped with atomic bombs on standby. General Douglas MacArthur requested authority to use nuclear weapons if United Nations forces were pushed back. The Joint Chiefs later removed the bombers from his command to prevent unauthorized use.\n\n### What happened during the Norwegian Rocket Incident?\n\nOn January 25, 1995, a research rocket launched from Norway was mistaken by Russian early-warning systems for a U.S. missile attack. President Boris Yeltsin was prepared to order a nuclear response but stood down after the rocket's trajectory veered away from Russian airspace.\n\n### What caused the NORAD Computer Glitch?\n\nIn 1979, a computer glitch at NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado simulated a Soviet missile attack. The alert was quickly determined to be false after checking supplementary radar systems and satellite data, preventing a potential nuclear retaliation.\n\n### What was the B-59 Incident during the Cuban Missile Crisis?\n\nOn October 27, 1962, the Soviet submarine B-59, equipped with a nuclear torpedo, was detected by the U.S. Navy. The submarine's captain, believing they were under attack, wanted to launch the torpedo. However, the second-in-command, Vasili Arkhipov, refused to agree, preventing a nuclear escalation.\n\n### Why was the Korean War nuclear threat contentious?\n\nThe Korean War nuclear threat is contentious because General Douglas MacArthur's statements about his willingness to use nuclear weapons were contradictory. He denied recommending their use under oath but later described a plan involving atomic bombs in an interview.\n\n### What was the significance of the Black Brant XII rocket launch?\n\nThe Black Brant XII rocket launch from Norway in 1995 was significant because it was mistaken for a U.S. missile attack by Russian early-warning systems. This incident highlighted the dangers of miscommunication and the potential for nuclear escalation during the post-Cold War era.\n\n### How did the NORAD Computer Glitch affect U.S. military readiness?\n\nThe NORAD Computer Glitch in 1979 put the U.S. military on high alert, with bombers being put into the air and missiles being primed for launch. The incident underscored the importance of verifying data before taking drastic actions.\n\n### What role did Vasili Arkhipov play in the B-59 Incident?\n\nVasili Arkhipov, the second-in-command on the Soviet submarine B-59, played a crucial role in preventing a nuclear escalation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He refused to agree to launch a nuclear torpedo, despite the captain's insistence, thereby averting a potential nuclear conflict.\n\n### What was the outcome of the Stanislav Petrov Incident?\n\nThe outcome of the Stanislav Petrov Incident was the prevention of a potential nuclear war. Petrov's logical assessment of the false alarm and his decision not to relay it to his superiors averted a catastrophic response from the Soviet Union.\n\n## Sources\n\n- [Original Side Projects video: 5 Times That The Nukes Were Nearly Launched](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qxxWL43t4aM)\n\n## Related Coverage" url: https://sideprojects.pub/article/5-times-nukes-nearly-launched.md canonical: https://sideprojects.pub/article/5-times-nukes-nearly-launched datePublished: 2026-06-25 dateModified: 2026-06-25 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://sideprojects.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: Side Projects image: "https://media.sideprojects.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/qxxWL43t4aM/hero.jpg" type: NewsArticle contentHash: 6a765c18b5e7f553256a4097431d3fb0fb5fb51fad1f7e144931109140a39826 tokens: 5837 summaryUrl: https://sideprojects.pub/article/5-times-nukes-nearly-launched.md.summary.md --- Truly, there are few prospects more terrifying than that of a nuclear war, something that, in its worst and most deadly iteration, could well have the potential to not just end advanced human civilisation as we know it, but potentially, all human life, period. But at least it's never happened, right? As, after all, nuclear weapons were used in WWII, and after seeing just how truly devastating they were, the button was never pushed ever again – or so the story goes. And while, yes, that is indeed true, thank God, that doesn't mean that we haven't come really, **really** close to crossing the nuclear Rubicon; usually by accident, but also, and perhaps more shockingly still, intentionally, with the occasional General seemingly not having gotten the memo after WWII. It's a prospect that is every bit as fascinating as it is terrifying, and so, today, we are going to be satisfying that curiosity by having a look at five times that the nukes were nearly launched. ## 1. The Stanislav Petrov Incident Even by Cold War standards, the US and the USSR weren't exactly getting along come the 1980s. In 1979 alone, for example, the former had deployed RSD-10 Pioneer Medium Range Nuclear Missiles—capable of striking targets in West Germany, France, and the UK in less than 10 minutes—to its Western border in response to a NATO condemnation of its Invasion of Afghanistan the same year, and in turn, the US had adopted its so called 'Double-Track Decision' in December, which called for the deployment of Pershing II Medium Range Nuclear Missiles—themselves capable of hitting targets in Ukraine, Belarus, or Lithuania in sub-10 minutes—should talks to see the aforementioned RSDs removed from Europe fail. This, naturally, was a bit of a tense situation, and what was needed in response was for calm heads to prevail on both sides of the Iron Curtain, so that the super powers could sit down at the same table, talk it out like adults, and find a way to step back from the nuclear brink with both their dignities, and indeed the world, still intact. This being the Cold War however, that is not what happened, and instead, what happened was chest beating and windmilling a plenty on both sides; with the US going out of its way to 'probe' Soviet radar systems by flying bombers right towards Moscow, and other important targets, only to pull them away just before they entered Soviet Airspace. The Soviets, for their part, did **exactly the same** to NATO countries in return. What the world **really** didn't need amidst all of that was for an early-warning satellite to take a peculiar turn, and start falsely reporting that the other team had lit the match on some of its missiles, as, with things the way they were, the powers that be were far more likely to take leave of their senses, and order an immediate and full retaliation in response. Alas, on the 26th of September 1983, that is exactly what happened, as one of the Soviet Oko early-warning satellites, being monitored from an apocalypse proof bunker near Moscow, suddenly started saying that it had identified a single missile launch from the Continental United States, and then four more mere moments later. Sat at the console was one Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov. According to the regulations, he should have phoned it into his superiors immediately, to give them all the time needed to get every possible missile out of its silo, and every possible bomber into the air, so that they could make damned sure that if they were going down, America was going down with them. Luckily, however, Petrov was one of God's thinkers, and so, as he sat there with the phone in his hand, being well aware of **exactly** what was at stake, he took a brief moment to consider the situation logically, and quickly happened upon the realisation that a launch of merely five missiles just didn't make sense; the Americans knew that if they launched even one missile, that they'd be getting the Soviet's entire arsenal in return, so surely they'd go all out? Sensing that something was amiss, Petrov then went to compare the data his Oko satellite was feeding him with data from over-the-horizon radar installations, which showed… nothing. With that, his phone was placed back in its receiver, and the world was saved, with it later being found out that the false alarm was triggered by an unusual alignment of sunlight reflecting off of high-altitude clouds. It's a good thing he was so level-headed too, because at that time the Soviet Leader was one Yuri Andropov, a former KGB man who harboured a **deep** mistrust of his American equivalent, and if the incorrect data had been relayed to him, well, let's just say a reasoned and well considered response would have been unlikely. ## 2. The Korean War Nuclear weapons **may** have also been dangerously close to being deployed in the Korean War too; and we can't stress the word 'may' enough – as it's quite the unclear and contentious matter all in all. Certainly, there is no doubt that the US was willing to use them, as, on the 1st of August 1950, the 9th Bomb Wing of the US Airforce, which was equipped with 10 B-29 Bombers, each carrying a single Mark 4 Atomic Bomb apiece, was dispatched to Guam, where they were to stay on standby as a so called "Atomic Task Force," one that was primed and ready to go, should the call come down. Knowing that, the question is less 'would they have done it,' and more 'under what conditions would they have done it.' It is also a question that revolves around one man, and that would be Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea, as many argue that he was **rather** enthusiastic to smash the big red button. What **is** known for certain is that on the 9th of December 1950, he requested authority as a Field Commander to deploy atomic bombs as he saw fit; albeit stressing that he only wished to use them if the United Nations Forces were pushed back to the point of being routed from the Peninsula. And he didn't want to just use them on North Korean and Chinese troops on the Peninsula either, as 15 days later, on Christmas Eve in fact, he submitted a list of prospective targets to the Pentagon. We won't worry about what he called these, as he used a word that has aged **very** badly, but we will worry about what his aim was: to decimate both North Korea and China so extensively, that continued military resistance became impossible, and for this, he had chalked up 34 targets. With time, some of the Joint Chiefs became so concerned over the prospect of MacArthur getting a bit trigger happy with the nukes, that in 1951 they completely pulled the 9th Bomb Wing from his roster, and instead handed it to Strategic Air Command; an organisation that had absolutely nothing to do with MacArthur. As a result, there were no blurry grey lines, no middlemen of unclear authority; just the President that would give the order, the B-29s that would execute it, and a single direct line of command and communication between the two. Eventually, MacArthur was stripped of his command all together on the 11th of April, and so the matter became moot… but would he have **actually done** it? That's the question we need to get to the bottom of, and unfortunately, it's a question to which there is no clear answer even 70+ years after the fact. For example, MacArthur himself swore under oath before a Senate Enquiry after the war that he had **never** explicitly recommended their use, and had also publicly admonished Truman in 1960 when the Former President had suggested that he had. But then, on the flipside, he said this in a 1954 interview, quote: > "I could have won the war in Korea in a maximum of 10 days.... I would have dropped between 30 and 50 atomic bombs on his air bases and other depots strung across the neck of Manchuria.... It was my plan as our amphibious forces moved south to spread behind us—from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea—a belt of radioactive cobalt. It could have been spread from wagons, carts, trucks and planes.... For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the north. The enemy could not have marched across that radiated belt." But wait, it gets more complicated still, because while at this point, we might be tempted to write MacArthur off as a Doctor Strangelove character made real, both Presidents Nixon and Kennedy later claimed that he had urged **extreme** caution and hesitancy in deploying nuclear weapons when offering them personal counsel. Ultimately, we simply don't know for certain. Someone was lying, that much is clear, but as to whom it was, it's likely we will never know at this point when the primary sources are full of such contradictory claims. ## 3. The Norwegian Rocket Incident Our next nuclear near miss **actually occurred** after the Cold War, specifically on the 25th of January 1995. It was caused by the launch of a Black Brant XII rocket from the Andøya Rocket Range in Norway. It wasn't even a military mission, with the rocket in question being a simple research rocket whose only payload was a load of measuring equipment, and the people who launched it, they were but humble American and Norwegian scientists, who were eagerly anticipating learning all manner of interesting things about the aurora borealis over Svalbard. Unbeknown to them, however, their rocket, launched from where it was, with the trajectory that it was, just so happened to coincide with a corridor that the Russians predicted the Americans would use, if they were to launch the Minuteman III ICBMs that they had in their North Dakota silos, and aim them at Moscow. It got worse still however, because when the Olenegorsk early-warning radar station in Murmansk Oblast detected the Black Brant, to them, the speed and flight pattern resembled that of a US Navy submarine launched Trident ICBM; particularly if the US was trying to get the drop on Russia with an atmospheric detonation – the kind that would create an EMP effect that would devastate their electrical infrastructure, and leave the whole country's defence grid blind. Neither interpretation left a clean pair of underpants, and so the alert was raised, escalated through the military's hierarchy, and eventually found its way to then President Boris Yeltsin. Fearing the worst, he immediately had Cheget, the 'nuclear briefcase' that allowed him to communicate instantaneously with all of Russia's nuclear forces from anywhere in the world primed, and with it, he ordered all of his submarine commanders to ready their missiles, and all of his bombers to get fuelled up and into the air, before then sitting down to watch the situation develop with his top military advisors. For eight minutes they sat there, Yeltsin ready and willing to give the greenlight if he deemed it necessary. Fortunately, the Black Brant then began to veer away from Russian Airspace, and thus it was deemed that whatever it was, it posed no threat, and so the country's nuclear forces were stood down. Now, I know what you are all thinking, why didn't the scientists just inform Russia of what they were doing to prevent exactly this situation from happening? Well, funny story, they did, as well as 29 other countries in fact. But unfortunately, 90's Russia was… how to put it eloquently… 'a bit of a mess,' we'll say, and as a result, the scientists' heads up never reached where it needed to go; having gotten lost in a sea of incompetent bureaucracy, with some sources even saying that the report was passed solely to the Russian Coast Guard and Civilian Shipping Authority, after it had been interpreted as a warning to shipping as to where the rocket might end up landing. If that sounds unbelievable, find your nearest Russian and ask them for their memories of the 90s; it was a **wild** time – and that's putting it mildly. ## 4. The NORAD Computer Glitch 1979, as we have already discussed, was a year when tensions started to **really** build up between the US and the USSR, after a series of unfortunate events that began with the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. What we haven't already discussed, however, was that 1979 also had its own nuclear near miss separate to all of that, and it all happened at the North American Air Defense Command, or NORAD, a Binational Military Command between the US and Canada that monitors and defends the two nations' airspace and provides early warnings of potential threats from the air, space, or sea. As for what caused the near miss, that'd just be a simple computer glitch. It was 3am when the display screens at NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado decided to go haywire. One moment, everything was quiet. The next, the screens lit up with the chilling message that 250 Soviet ICBMs were en-route to turn the US: enough to reduce the country to little but an atomic wasteland. Naturally, this little late-night surprise immediately put the US on full alert. The data got forwarded to every big-name command centre you can think of; the Pentagon's National Military Command Center, Strategic Air Command Headquarters, the Alternate National Military Command Center – the whole lot were immediately informed and put on high alert, with bombers being put into the air and missiles being primed ready to launch. Even the National Emergency Airborne Command Post—the plane that serves as the President's flying apocalypse proof war room—was prepped for take off. Luckily, in what is a recurring theme in nuclear near misses, a logical approach was chosen, with the powers that be wanting to make **absolutely sure** these missiles were both real, and coming their way, before they ordered a full retaliation. And much like had happened to Stanislav Petrov, supplementary ground-based radar systems and satellite data was checked, which showed… nothing. Not a single missile, just empty sky. They sat it out a few minutes just to be sure, and when sufficient time had passed to make it clear that no missiles were inbound—about seven minutes—a big breath was taken by all, and America's nuclear arsenal was stood down. So, what happened then? The answer to that, could just be the worst one we have seen yet, as this one wasn't even caused by a civilian rocket that they were ignorant of, or an early-warning satellite getting a duff reading off of some unforeseen weather condition, no. Instead, it was caused by human error, as some bright spark had loaded the wrong tape into the NORAD computer; specifically, one that was meant to be used for training exercises, and made the computer simulate the Russians launching a full surprise attack. Knowing that, we suspect that said training tape went missing shortly afterwards, the only hint as to where it ended up being a single poor recruit who was walking like John Wayne for weeks afterwards. ## 5. The B-59 Incident As far as nuclear flashpoints go, there was probably none greater than the Cuban Missile Crisis, when, for 13 terrifying days in October 1962, the US and the USSR locked horns over a load of R-12 Medium Range, and R-14 Intermediate Range, Nuclear Missiles that the Soviets had plonked in the crisis' titular country. The story is a well told one: lots of fear, lots of chest beating, and the USSR eventually pledging to remove its missiles from Cuba openly in exchange for the US removing some missiles from Turkey secretly – all the while their nuclear arsenals were primed and pointed at one another, ready to go at a moment's notice. But that synopsis, while terrifying enough in its own right, is only actually part of the story, because in the shadows, or more specifically under the waves, as the broader crisis played out, there was a far, **far** closer shave with nuclear Armageddon. It happened on the 27th of October, aboard B-59, a Soviet Project 641 Class submarine that was packing a little something extra: a T-5 nuclear tipped torpedo… and it **very** nearly launched it. Nuclear torpedoes, in case you don't know, are a uniquely terrifying sort of weapon. Quite literally just being 'normal' torpedoes, but with a nuclear payload, they can be deployed to outright destroy multiple ships that they catch in their blast, both surface and submerged, as well as destroy countless more as they create waves of such intense force and pressure that ships caught in it, simply crack and fall apart. As for how B-59 came to nearly launch its T-5, that would be because the US Navy was blockading Cuba during the crisis, and to prevent said blockade from being circumvented, **all** submarines that were detected were ordered to surface and identify themselves; and this was communicated by the dropping of reduced yield training depth charges in their vicinity. Doing so was a well understood practise, but unfortunately, conditions aboard B-59 weren't exactly conducive to keeping a clear head. In fact, they were basically akin to a living nightmare, having been submerged for days, and thus being unable to recharge batteries, take on fresh air, or vent heat. As a result, oxygen was running low, carbon dioxide was building up, and the crew was sweaty, exhausted. And none were affected by those terrible conditions more than B-59's Captain, Valentin Savitsky. In his stressed state, when depth charges started detonating around him, he was convinced that his submarine was under attack, and that it was go time as a result; a situation that wasn't helped by his being cut off from Moscow – and thus having no idea if a wider attack was under way. Finally snapping under the pressure, he declared, quote: > "We're going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all — we will not disgrace our Navy!" Now, while that might have been a jolly exciting declaration, in Soviet Doctrine, the call wasn't his to make, with the deployment of nuclear weapons being **such** a big deal, that it could only be done with unanimous agreement of all Senior Officers on board. At that time, there were three such Officers, and while B-59's Political Commissar Ivan Maslennikov agreed, the 2IC, Vasili Arkhipov, did not. He reasoned that such an extreme choice should only be made following **clear** orders, and after much screaming across the sub's bridge, Maslennikov and Savitsky came around to his way of thinking. Then, with nothing else to be done, B-59 surfaced, was told by the US Navy that no war had started, and that was that; potentially world ending escalation had been averted. The Soviets, as you would well expect, were quite keen to keep what had (nearly) happened aboard B-59 under wraps, and so the story was hidden, and its protagonist gagged for 40 years, with Arkhipov's world saving heroics only coming to the surface, pun intended, during a conference that marked the 40th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 2002. Sadly, Arkhipov had passed away only four years prior, and so he never got to know of the reverence with which he is now regarded. But, for what it's worth Arkhipov, if you happen to get YouTube up in heaven; on behalf of every human of your time, today, and from the future, all of whom live only because of your decision – thank you. ## Key Takeaways - The world has come close to nuclear war multiple times due to accidents and miscommunications. - Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov prevented a potential nuclear war in 1983 by correctly identifying a false alarm. - During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur's intentions regarding nuclear weapons remain unclear. - A Norwegian research rocket launch in 1995 nearly triggered a nuclear response from Russia due to misinterpretation. - Human error and technical glitches have played significant roles in near-miss nuclear incidents. ## Frequently Asked Questions ### What was the Stanislav Petrov Incident? The Stanislav Petrov Incident occurred on September 26, 1983, when a Soviet early-warning satellite falsely reported that the United States had launched missiles. Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, who was monitoring the satellite, logically deduced that the report was incorrect and did not relay the false alarm to his superiors, preventing a potential nuclear retaliation. ### What was the Korean War's nuclear threat? During the Korean War, the U.S. had B-29 bombers equipped with atomic bombs on standby. General Douglas MacArthur requested authority to use nuclear weapons if United Nations forces were pushed back. The Joint Chiefs later removed the bombers from his command to prevent unauthorized use. ### What happened during the Norwegian Rocket Incident? On January 25, 1995, a research rocket launched from Norway was mistaken by Russian early-warning systems for a U.S. missile attack. President Boris Yeltsin was prepared to order a nuclear response but stood down after the rocket's trajectory veered away from Russian airspace. ### What caused the NORAD Computer Glitch? In 1979, a computer glitch at NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado simulated a Soviet missile attack. The alert was quickly determined to be false after checking supplementary radar systems and satellite data, preventing a potential nuclear retaliation. ### What was the B-59 Incident during the Cuban Missile Crisis? On October 27, 1962, the Soviet submarine B-59, equipped with a nuclear torpedo, was detected by the U.S. Navy. The submarine's captain, believing they were under attack, wanted to launch the torpedo. However, the second-in-command, Vasili Arkhipov, refused to agree, preventing a nuclear escalation. ### Why was the Korean War nuclear threat contentious? The Korean War nuclear threat is contentious because General Douglas MacArthur's statements about his willingness to use nuclear weapons were contradictory. He denied recommending their use under oath but later described a plan involving atomic bombs in an interview. ### What was the significance of the Black Brant XII rocket launch? The Black Brant XII rocket launch from Norway in 1995 was significant because it was mistaken for a U.S. missile attack by Russian early-warning systems. This incident highlighted the dangers of miscommunication and the potential for nuclear escalation during the post-Cold War era. ### How did the NORAD Computer Glitch affect U.S. military readiness? The NORAD Computer Glitch in 1979 put the U.S. military on high alert, with bombers being put into the air and missiles being primed for launch. The incident underscored the importance of verifying data before taking drastic actions. ### What role did Vasili Arkhipov play in the B-59 Incident? Vasili Arkhipov, the second-in-command on the Soviet submarine B-59, played a crucial role in preventing a nuclear escalation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He refused to agree to launch a nuclear torpedo, despite the captain's insistence, thereby averting a potential nuclear conflict. ### What was the outcome of the Stanislav Petrov Incident? The outcome of the Stanislav Petrov Incident was the prevention of a potential nuclear war. Petrov's logical assessment of the false alarm and his decision not to relay it to his superiors averted a catastrophic response from the Soviet Union. ## Sources - [Original Side Projects video: 5 Times That The Nukes Were Nearly Launched](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qxxWL43t4aM) ## Related Coverage